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Morality and Prudence: A Case for Substantial Overlap and Limited Conflict 
1. Topic and Approach 
It is virtually impossible to say anything substantial about how morality and prudence relate 
to one another unless we make assumptions about their content. In what follows, I will make 
use of a minimal definition, according to which prudence concerns the rational pursuit of 
personal interest and happiness. In this connection, I use happiness as an evaluative term, as 
something desirable that makes life as a whole good, better or successful.1 However, the 
nature of happiness is only discussed insofar as it is directly relevant for understanding how 
prudence relates to morality. As far as possible, I want to be neutral about how happiness, 
self-interest, and morality are to be defined, since defining these terms is beyond the scope of 
this article and any definition can favor certain theories while excluding others, which would 
make the discussion unnecessarily narrow in scope.2 Nevertheless, I distinguish between the 
following interpretations of morality (or moral virtue and moral rationality): 
(1) That we give significant weight to the interests of others (independently of prudential 
concerns); 
(2) that the interests of others weigh at least as much as our own;  
(3) that full impartiality is required (e.g. the universalization of maxims).3 
In this paper I discuss problems that arise if we accept (2) or (3), particularly the dualism of 
practical reason and Robert Adams’ demoralization thesis. These problems do not arise if we 
give so little weight to the interests of others that it is moral to sacrifice them if prudential 
interests are undermined (a weak form of 1). The argument I develop is largely consistent 
with several different frameworks in normative ethics (e.g. virtue-ethics, Kantianism). In what 
follows I proceed via negativa by discussing how not to conceive of morality and prudence. I 
then argue for an intermediary position, in which morality and prudence substantially overlap. 
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This position neither implies nor precludes eudaimonism; it is compatible with valuing 
morality for its own sake, and allows for seeing moral reasons as overriding and categorical.4 
The argument I develop rests on the assumption that we rightly tend to take strong interests in 
both morality and prudence, and that the two need not be identical. I assume that morality is 
binding on us and that moral life is possible, and try to articulate presuppositions, or 
conditions of possibility, for moral life.5 By this, I aim to articulate non-exhaustive conditions 
to which we are (at least implicitly) committed insofar as we are moral and rational. 
 The relation between morality and prudence is central to contemporary debates on 
ethical egoism, eudaimonism, the authority of morality, practical rationality, normative 
pluralism, incommensurability, incomparability, as well as discussions of providence and 
moral order.6 How morality and prudence relate can be seen as a theoretical and empirical 
question which concerns our knowledge of the world. However, it might also be seen as a 
question that concerns the ethics of belief, or what we should believe about morality and 
prudence if we cannot settle the issue with adequate theoretical knowledge.7 
 
2. The Idea of a Moral Order 
The first view says that morality coincides fully with prudence and immorality with 
imprudence. This view is often interpreted causally in the sense that morality causes 
happiness and vice causes unhappiness (another variant states that morality and prudence are 
identical).8 Although this view seems appealing, meritocratic and egalitarian, there are also 
serious problems with it.  
 It seems clear that we do not experience human history as such a moral order. Rather, 
some good agents seem unhappy (or imprudent), while some happy (or prudent) agents do not 
seem good. In particular, the existence of injustice and tragedies indicates that this is the 
case.9 Aristotle writes: “Those who assert that the person broken on the wheel and falling into 
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great misfortunes is happy, if only he is good, are […] talking nonsense.”10 The idea of a 
moral order simply explains away coincidences, injustices and tragedies by confusing natural 
evil with moral evil and natural disasters with moral disasters.11 A full overlap between 
morality and prudence would legitimize everything that happens in the history of humanity. 
The happy and prudent are justified, since they are seen as morally good, while the unhappy 
and imprudent are demonized, since they are taken to be vicious, immoral or evil. Reality is 
seen as legitimate and rational, since it expresses moral and prudential rationality. There is no 
point in trying to make the world a better place by making society more just or meritocratic, 
since it is perfect already. 
This view can also be criticized for not leaving enough room for moral action and 
moral development if it is possible to attain complete and comprehensive happiness in this life 
(as assumed by some eudaimonists). Insofar as happiness is comprehensive, it will put an end 
to our desires; we will neither lack anything, nor desire nor strive for anything, if we are 
perfectly happy.12 An operative moral order would then simply undermine the very need for 
moral action. Only immoral and amoral agents would be able to act and strive (although they 
would never attain happiness). It therefore seems like we need some minimal unhappiness or 
imperfection in order to act, strive and develop morally.13 Otherwise, the result seems to be a 
contemplative and boring state for good agents.14  
Finally, a moral order threatens moral motivation. As Jens Timmermann writes, if a being:  
 
cannot experience any tension between prudence and the demands of morality it cannot be 
moved by, or take a pure interest in, the moral law as such […] We need the “subjective 
antagonism” […] of moral law and inclination for the law to affect our subjectivity. When 
we perceive that selfishness and moral judgement conflict, we realize for the first time that 
we are not enthralled by inclination, and that there is something within us that is active 
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and radically free. This inspires respect, which in turn enables us to act independently of 
self-regarding considerations.15 
 
This Kantian argument can perhaps be adopted by eudaimonists, since the virtues involve 
other-regarding concerns that cannot be reduced to a self-regarding striving for happiness.16 
The virtue of justice, notably, should not merely serve my happiness but give to each what 
they deserve. Virtue must therefore be valued for its own sake, not just because it serves 
personal interest or happiness. However, this seems virtually impossible if virtue and 
prudence necessarily coincide (or are coextensive), since we would then confuse the 
instrumental role of virtue with its constitutive (intrinsic) role. Thus, any conflict between 
virtue and prudence has the advantage of illustrating that virtue should be sought for its own 
sake.17 It is morally preferable if the moral order is transcendent, because we can only act 
morally in an imperfect world, in which morality and prudence diverge, a world in which we 
cannot always know if morality serves personal interest or happiness.18  
The idea of a moral order is deeply problematic if it is identified fully with human 
history. Overall, these problems suffice for rejecting full overlap between morality and 
prudence. This indicates that the tension between morality and prudence is systematic, 
representing a fundamental – if minimal – structural feature of human rationality. Practical 
rationality presupposes at least two heterogeneous values, goods or reasons, represented by 
morality and prudence.19 Without some divergence between morality and prudence, the 
position is vulnerable to the problems identified above (e.g., demonizing the unhappy). 
Nevertheless, this view does not rule out the claim that virtuous agents are happier than 
vicious agents and that the virtuous therefore handle adversity better than others. However, it 
is incompatible with the Stoic claim that the virtuous are completely happy, invulnerable and 
self-sufficient, like unconquerable fortresses.20 Even if the virtuous harmonize morality and 
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prudence to a greater extent than the vicious do, this does not guarantee a complete overlap 
between the two or even that moral perfection is humanly possible (as assumed by the Stoics).  
The relation between morality and prudence even seems to vary somewhat across 
societies. More specifically, societies that allow immoral practices such as slavery and torture 
involve a clearer conflict between morality and prudence than societies that prohibit these 
practices.21 The idea of a moral order is more convincing and appealing if it is interpreted as 
an ideal world that we may hope to progress towards in the future. In other words, it can be 
considered as an idea that we should strive towards by acting morally and politically in ways 
that minimize conflicts between morality and prudence (e.g. by organizing society in such a 
way that it pays off to be law-abiding, hard-working and eco-friendly). John Silber argues, for 
instance, that we work towards the idea of a moral order by promoting proportionality 
between desert and happiness, in many different activities such as grading of papers, serving 
on juries, and rearing children.22 Still, moral agency would be undermined if the moral order 
were completely realized at some point in human history. A complete realization of the moral 
order must therefore – if possible – be situated not in history but outside it. The idea of a 
moral order can then be interpreted as a regulative idea that we should promote and 
approximate, although the idea itself is transcendent.  
 
3. Morality and Prudence Always Clash 
According to the second view, morality coincides completely with imprudence, while 
immorality coincides completely with prudence.23 This avoids some of the problems 
associated with the previous position but it introduces new problems. First, this position is 
very difficult to support empirically, even if we admit that cases of injustice and tragedy are 
all too common.24 Conflicts between morality and prudence seem to represent local, 
contingent phenomena, rather than anything universal or inevitable. Psychological studies 
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even indicate that some moral behavior, such as volunteer work or kindness, does in fact 
makes us happier in various respects. Empirical research points to a positive connection 
between morality and prudence, irrespective of the theory of happiness we favor.25  
Second, this pessimistic view rules out, or tries to explain away, coincidences or 
contingencies because prudence is taken to coincide perfectly with immorality. This position 
has the same problem as the previous position, except that the relations between (i) morality 
and prudence, and between (ii) moral and natural evil, are inverted. The previous position 
legitimizes and favors the happy, successful and fortunate, whereas this position legitimizes 
and favors the unhappy, imprudent and miserable.  
Third, moral virtue seems to require that we enjoy being moral. We must, at least, 
gladly be moral rather than reluctantly.26 It then seems impossible to become totally unhappy, 
or lose all personal interests, by being moral; any conflict between morality and prudence 
must be partial instead of total. Finally, this pessimistic position involves splitting our 
practical rationality into two separate and incompatible normative domains, which are both 
necessary. The result is a (global) dualism of practical reason that demands both that we seek 
personal interest and happiness and that we sacrifice it for the sake of morality.27 It would 
consequently be simultaneously true and untrue that we ought to seek happiness and self-
interest, just like it would be both true and untrue that we ought to be moral.28 When both 
morality and prudence are necessary, and cannot be reconciled, we get a dualism that prevents 
a higher standpoint from which morality and prudence can be mediated. This dualism leads to 
a normative pluralism, in which morality and prudence are incommensurable normative 
domains.29 What is morally right differs from what is prudentially right; moreover, there is no 
higher standpoint which can overcome this dualism and prescribe what is best all-things-
considered. There is no single overarching norm of rationality that prescribes action, but only 
two incompatible normative domains which are both authoritative. To change perspective 
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from morality to prudence, or vice versa, involves a Gestalt switch, as it is impossible to find 
common ground and to take on both perspectives simultaneously. Practical reason is at odds 
with itself and the conflict cannot be settled rationally with arguments. The result is either 
paralysis or that non-rational impulses become decisive for moral action, something which 
undermines the rational authority of morality.30  
The dualism of practical reason is weakened but not eliminated if we insist, in a 
Kantian manner, that morality has priority over prudence. For Kant admits that conflicts 
between morality and prudence involve a dilemma. The first horn of the dilemma takes the 
form of prioritizing prudence over morality. Kant criticizes this position for “throw[ing] away 
and despis[ing] the law of virtue” and “giv[ing] way to vices.”31 The second horn involves 
holding morality to be self-sufficient, either by reducing prudence to morality or by denying 
that prudence is needed. Kant describes the former position as that of a Stoic and the latter as 
that of a virtuous fool or dreamer (Phantast). The Stoic strains “the moral capacity of the 
human being [...] far beyond all the limits of his nature”; he assumes “something that 
contradicts all cognition of the human being” by raising “himself above the animal nature of 
the human being” and claiming himself to be “sufficient to himself.”32 The Stoic line of 
reasoning fails since the moral agent is not only a free rational being, but also a finite natural 
and sensuous being with needs and desires. The Stoic thereby lacks something to satisfy his 
vital needs and something to mediate between moral freedom and nature. As a result, he 
leaves unresolved whether or not everything necessary for being virtuous will be provided by 
nature.33 Similarly, he who denies the importance of prudence is a fool or a Phantast, since he 
denies his own nature and “expect[s] no consequences which are worthy of” his conduct.34 
Kant concludes that, without belief in a moral order, the result is an “unstable condition” in 
which we continuously fall “from hope into doubt and mistrust.”35  
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The important point is that a serious perceived or experienced conflict between 
morality and prudence leads to demoralization, in the sense of weakened or deteriorated moral 
motivation. I will refer to this as the demoralization thesis, a thesis put forward by Robert 
Adams, which claims that a serious, inescapable conflict between morality and prudence 
tends to result in demoralization. Even if some agents manage to sacrifice their happiness or 
self-interest for the sake of morality, it still seems somewhat unrealistic and overly demanding 
to consider it a general demand to renounce personal interests and happiness. At least, this 
seems to be the case either if personal interests or happiness are objective goods which benefit 
us (whether we recognize it or not), or if they are something we psychologically desire or 
strive for.36 A strong conflict between morality and prudence is then likely to lead to 
demoralization as a general tendency.37 Psychological literature offers some support for the 
demoralization thesis in cases in which we sacrifice virtually everything – including 
happiness – to the end of survival. Concentration camp prisoners, notably, are reported to 
have been almost universally demoralized as a result of miserable living conditions.38  
This is not just a psychological problem, but also a problem concerning the rational 
authority of morality. Do we have most reason to prioritize morality or prudence, given a 
strong and inevitable conflict between the two?39 Is it rational, all-things-considered, for an 
individual to sacrifice happiness and self-interest? Quietists take morality to require total self-
forgetfulness and renunciation of all self-interested motivation. They think that virtue is 
incompatible with “any though of the benefits one gains from” being virtuous (notably 
personal happiness).40 However, this position seems too extreme. Consider promoting the 
happiness and interests of others in a world in which morality and prudence are incompatible. 
Although it seems moral to promote others’ happiness and interests, it would nevertheless 
undermine their own morality. The absurd implication is that my morality is incompatible 
with their morality. The absurdity can be avoided either by rejecting this pessimistic position 
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or by rejecting that it is moral to promote others’ happiness and interests. The former is 
clearly more reasonable than the latter. It then appears that we have stronger reasons for 
rejecting the pessimistic position than the previous position (and the next one). 
 
4. The World as a Moral Lottery 
The idea of a moral lottery implies that the relation between morality and prudence is 
completely contingent and arbitrary.41 On this view, personal interests and happiness depend 
on good fortune, whereas morality depends on human freedom. This is an anti-egalitarian 
position, according to which some are lucky and others unlucky. The position is modern 
insofar as nature is separated sharply from morality; natural evil is not moral evil, and natural 
laws are not moral laws. Nature is entirely amoral and indifferent towards morality. 
This position tends to reduce moral agency to inner actions that only concern volition, 
motivation and dispositions. This is similar to a dualistic, Kantian position in which the good 
will is morally valuable even if hindered by disfavors of fortune.42 However, it seems deeply 
problematic if moral agency is totally powerless and if moral actions cannot make any 
difference whatsoever as far as happiness and self-interest is concerned. Psychological studies 
tend to undermine this dualistic picture.43 And not even Kant would say that moral action is 
entirely disconnected from, or without effect in, nature. Although some moral actions may fail 
to realize their intended goals (because of mishaps or other contingent circumstances outside 
of our control), this does not imply that moral agency generally fails. For it seems like 
coincidences, which prevent the realization of our moral intentions and plans, represent local 
phenomena that are contingent rather than anything universal and necessary. Moreover, even 
if the relation between morality and prudence is contingent, it need not be completely 
arbitrary or preclude some kind of causal connection, regularity or correlation. 
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Viewing the world as a lottery, as this position does, makes practical reason a hostage 
to fortune. Even if we were to attain both virtue and happiness, happiness would still not 
result from our striving, but from coincidences beyond our control. And why should we strive 
for something that we can neither control nor influence, since the outcome is entirely in the 
hands of fortune? This position makes us suffering victims rather than rational agents who 
influence our own situation in any predictable manner. It undermines our all-things-
considered rationality and prudential rationality. Practical rationality is split into two separate 
domains, morality and prudence, which cannot be coordinated in any predicable way. 
Planning, deliberation, and anticipation of outcomes becomes very difficult and moral agency 
is threatened by demoralization and the dualism of practical reason to various degrees at the 
local level.  
 
5. The Need for an Intermediary Position  
It is clear that the three positions we have discussed are all deeply problematic and that an 
intermediary position would be more promising. However, it seems much less clear exactly 
which intermediary position would be best. In the following, I will consider a position that is 
an intermediary between the first and the third positions, since I see the second position as the 
least promising. I will then assume that there are two different tendencies at work: There is a 
significant overlap or correlation between morality and prudence, but there are also 
contingencies and conflict that hinders a total overlap, or identity, of the two.  
 First, as previously mentioned, psychological studies indicate considerable overlap 
between moral behavior and prudence. As Valerie Tiberius summarizes:  
 
Psychologists do not study “being moral” – this is too vague and broad. But psychologists 
do study particular moral behaviors, such as volunteer work, kindness and helping. […] 
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this research shows [that] we have some [prudential] reasons to do some moral things. 
[…] doing helpful things for other people does cause us to be happier in various respects44  
 
Not only do helpfulness contribute to happiness but being happy also “tends to make people 
more sociable and concerned about others”.45 Another (related) reason for assuming a 
significant overlap between morality and prudence is that we tend to impose social sanctions 
on those who act immorally and to support those who act morally. Yet another reason is that 
we tend to experience shame, guilt, and anguish when doing wrong; we experience negative 
self-assessments that weaken self-respect and happiness. Finally, we tend to enjoy being 
moral and to promote the happiness of others, something that could both come from feelings 
of sympathy as well as having personal commitments and projects that include others’ 
happiness and interests.46 Indeed, genuine moral virtue seems to require that we enjoy being 
moral. At least, it requires that we are moral willingly and gladly rather than reluctantly.47 
Mathias Sagdahl writes: 
  
[I]t has been argued that those exhibiting traits or vices such as callousness or those who 
lack the moral virtues are unable to form true and faithful interpersonal relationships, such 
as true friendship and love. These relationships, it is argued, require a certain level of 
empathy and sympathy with other people, and to see people as valuable in non-
instrumental ways. The callous person lacks these sentiments and so is unable to form true 
relationships. In addition, they are unable to show their true selves to the world, but must 
act in secret and so cannot live sincerely. Living sincerely without hiding and pretence 
might be seen as a good in itself, but it might also be connected with inner states. Plato 
famously appealed to the “psychic harmony” enjoyed by the morally virtuous person, and 




In The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard argues that vicious and sinful agents not only lack 
psychic harmony, but also that they are in despair and deceive themselves, whether they 
recognize it or not.49 John Lemos develops an alternative approach. He argues that those who 
only pretend to be moral are likely to suffer social sanctions and ostracism: 
 
[T]he cunning, self-serving egoist who appears virtuous is always more likely to suffer as 
a consequence of his being such than is the man of virtue. Usually such selfish types 
acting under the guise of virtue are found out, and when this happens they are just as open 
to the misfortunes of anyone else who is caught in wrongdoing.50 
 
Lemos’ approach leads to a new problem (a problem not associated with the theories of 
psychic harmony and despair), namely that morality seems to be dependent on a society that 
may be corrupted by, for instance, sexism, racism or slavery. Lemos replies to this objection 
by arguing that prudence requires the development of “intellectual skills,” “knowledge, and 
critical thinking capacities” as a means of dealing with “changing social, economic, 
environmental, etc. conditions in life”; without such skills, knowledge and capacities, we are 
unlikely to become independent members of society with good chances of “living a happy and 
fulfilling life”.51 However, it is exactly this knowledge, and these skills and capacities, that 
give us insight into not only what is useful to us but also whether our morality is corrupted or 
not. It is exactly here that the critical potential lies. Imagine that you find out that the virtues 
you have inherited and appropriated involve a clear element of corruption. This insight is so 
disturbing that it will force you to choose between moral reform and (continued) corruption. 
However, an active choice of moral corruption represents a bad option for someone who is 
already committed towards morality, since it probably involves an element of self-deception 
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in order to repress the awareness of being corrupted. Prudence requires knowledge, skills and 
capacities that would prompt you to avoid self-deception, since self-deception is likely to 
breed unhappiness in the long-run by masking your true character and abilities, so that you 
misunderstand yourself and how you function in society. Self-deception therefore greatly 
increases the risk of mistakes and failures that seriously threaten long-term happiness. If this 
is right, the conclusion would follow that you are unlikely to be happy unless you are also 
moral.52 Lemos’ view is in line with eudaimonists, who plausibly argue that virtuous agents 
tend to handle varying situations better than vicious agents do. This is not just a point about 
the prudential advantages of being moral; it is also a point about how virtues involve 
dispositions, practical rationality and emotions, which help us cope with reality in an 
intelligent and skillful manner.53  
A different strategy for supporting overlap and compatibility between prudence and 
morality would be to make use of a heuristic notion of progress, as Kant does in the 
philosophy of history. This approach relies on a regulative notion of teleological progress 
used as a guiding principle for making sense of human history. History is interpreted 
teleologically as a coherent system that progresses, rather than as a mere aggregate of actions. 
More specifically, Kant assumes a regulative notion of historical progress towards legality, 
morality, and the moral order (the highest good), which seems to fit the empirical data to a 
considerable extent. At least, this seems to hold for the development towards democracy, 
human rights, juridification, education, enlightenment and technological-scientific progress.54 
For example, the development of the rule of law and representative government is assumed to 
“prepare the way for morality by making us less partial towards our own interest, disciplining 
our emotions, and instilling less violent behavior patterns”.55 This teleological interpretation 
of history is developed by Kant in order to make sense of history and to portray moral and 
prudential progress not just as possible but also feasible (the practical use of history matters 
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more than theoretical knowledge in this connection). It offers encouragement by providing a 
sense of coherence and purpose to human striving that can prevent demoralization and 
despair. Instead of postulating actual progress towards a moral order, Kant argues that such 
progress is possible and that there is room for hope. The upshot is that giving up on hope 
would be premature, since we cannot be absolutely sure that the world prevents us from 
progressing towards the moral order (as a regulative idea that transcends experience).56 
In different ways, these various considerations all support an intermediary position 
that involves a substantial overlap and considerable compatibility between morality and 
prudence. This intermediate position allows historical progress towards a moral order and 
prevents injustice and contingencies from completely undermining moral agency and practical 
reason. As a result, it largely avoids the problems associated with the previous positions (in 
Sections 2-4). More specifically, it makes room for moral motivation and moral development; 
and it avoids the worry that moral agency is undermined by arbitrariness, demoralization and 
an unresolvable dualism of practical reason. The intermediate position therefore seems to 
provide more room, or better conditions, for practical reason and moral agency.  
However, it cannot remove contingencies, injustice, suffering or death, particularly not 
at the local and individual levels. Practical reason and moral agency are secured at the 
collective, historical level, rather than at the individual level. For some individuals will suffer 
more than others because of bad luck, tragedies and injustice (something that increases the 
chances of demoralization and paralysis). Moreover, the Kantian approach to history involves 
general, progressive tendencies that may not help individuals, particularly not individuals in 
the past. The victims of the Third Reich, for instance, are not helped much by European Post-
War progress. In other words, individual agents may be threatened by injustice, suffering and 
death, although this need not undermine practical reason and the moral community in general 
(unless a global catastrophe results in human extinction). It is therefore clear that these 
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problems are greater at the individual level than at the collective, historical level. These 
considerations support substantial overlap and rough compatibility between morality and 
prudence in many rather than all cases. 
We should not rule out limited conflict between morality and prudence. Daniel 
Haybron gives an example of a situation in which one has to choose between adopting a child 
with autism and cerebral palsy, and letting the child live in an institution that provides 
tolerable but impersonal care.57 Adopting the child involves moral excellence at the price of a 
significant sacrifice of social activities, career opportunities, hobbies and personal economy. 
Another case of conflict between morality and prudence would be someone who either has to 
go along with racism, sexism and corruption or to protest against it, at the price of losing his 
job and social standing (at least temporally). In this case, it is the virtuous agent who suffers 
social and economic sanctions, although he is also likely to receive some support from 
sympathizers and oppressed groups.58 In cases like these, it seems that we can have sufficient 
moral reasons for sacrificing considerable prudential interests. Such moral sacrifices are 
incompatible both with positions that prioritize prudence over morality and with ethical 
egoism (the view that prudence is necessary and sufficient for morality).59 Still, we need not 
accept quietism, which demands a general sacrifice of personal interests and happiness. Nor 
do we need to accept anti-eudaimonism, the (closely related) view that proper regard for 
virtue rules out that virtue is “a part of, or a means to, our happiness” (or self-interest).60  
Instead, we can accept either non-eudaimonism or a form of eudaimonism that allows 
moral sacrifices. Non-eudaimonists (e.g. Kant) think that morality can be justified 
independently of prudence. They hold (in the words of Terence Irwin) that “we have 
sufficient reason to pursue virtue above all other goods or advantages even if it conflicts with 
happiness [and self-interest] or it does not affect it either way” (although prudence plays an 
important secondary role, since it can provide practical reasons and a second defense of 
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morality).61 Eudaimonists, by contrast, justify morality by appealing directly to prudence, 
seeing virtue as (at least partially) constitutive and necessary for happiness. Still, some 
eudaimonists do not just allow but also require that we prioritize morality over prudence at the 
level of particular actions and “local deliberations and motives” (as opposed to the global 
level of life as a whole).62 For it is more plausible to assume that we can have good reasons 
for sacrificing personal interests and happiness in particular situations, and to some degree, 
than to assume that prudence must be sacrificed totally. Sacrificing prudence to a maximal 
degree seems not only unacceptable prudentially, but also morally problematic, unless 
Adams’ demoralization thesis is wrong and quietism is right. At least, this seems to be the 
case if we want to avoid that morality becomes overly demanding, ascetic, elitist and 
unrealistic. 
There may even exist situations in which it would be morally right to sacrifice our 
lives.63 Still, it seems unfortunate to believe that morality demands that all personal interest 
and happiness is sacrificed and that we consequently have to live a life without any well-
being, self-interest or even contentment. It is difficult to see how we can function as rational 
agents without any understanding of prudence or self-interest. Even if we sacrifice much 
prudentially (as in the cases above), we still seem to need the idea of happiness or self-interest 
if we are to strive for a better life in any rational manner. The upshot is that moral sacrifices 
involve renouncing some measure of happiness rather than all happiness (or giving up some 
but not all personal interests). Being a parent, or adopting a child, typically reduces perceived 
happiness temporarily (the so-called parenting happiness gap). The preceding analysis clearly 
indicates that conflict between morality and prudence must be limited rather than total.  
It should be kept in mind that the alternatives to living morally are typically bad 
prudentially (although moral sacrifices would then be avoided). There are three mutually 
exclusive options: (i) We have to live with a bad conscience and feel shame, guilt or anguish, 
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something which undermines happiness and self-respect. (ii) We have to engage in self-
deception to hide our moral deficiency, something that is likely to breed unhappiness in the 
long run (as Lemos argued). (iii) We have to be egoistic amoralists who miss prudential 
advantages associated with being moral, especially when our amoralism is revealed 
(something that is not unlikely in the long run). For who would like to befriend, love or work 
with amoralists who are cunning or callous enough to hide their amoralism? And how likely is 
it that such amoralists are not exposed at some point; are they likely to be mistaken for 
virtuous friends, lovers, and colleagues who get substantial social support? Probably not.64 
Merely in order to try to avoid social sanctions, such amoralists will have to live continuously 
in secret, in a tiresome and risky manner. They cannot be sincere and share openly with others 
without being exposed. Nor can they experience the enjoyment that moral virtue involves or 
truly participate in social practices and sustain relationships in non-instrumental ways. They 
are cut off from meaningful and significant activities and projects that involve intersubjective, 
non-instrumental moral standards of assessment.65  
This indicates that it is prudentially counterproductive to be concerned only with one’s 
own interests and happiness.66 At least, it is not clear that amoralists in general are likely to be 
better off prudentially than moral agents are. This is something we firmly seem to believe 
when we try to raise our children to become not just happy, but also moral.67 We should in 
any case preclude the possibility that promoting the happiness and interests of others 
somehow undermines their morality, and we should rule out the possibility that our morality 
would be weakened if others promote our happiness and interests (see Section 3). This leads 
directly to the non-quietist assumption that morality and prudence must be thought of as being 
roughly compatible in general. Although we do not know whether prudence strictly requires 
virtue (as claimed by eudaimonists), it still seems, not only morally preferable, but probably 
also necessary for morality to be roughly compatible with prudence. Otherwise, it is not clear 
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how our morality is compatible with others’ morality or that we ought to promote their 
happiness and interests. Nor is it clear that demoralization (nor paralysis) can be avoided 
completely. 
The demoralization thesis need not imply that it is a problem if vicious agents become 
happy or realize their interests (we need not be demoralized by this unless we accept 
instrumentalism about virtue). The problem is with moral agents who are unhappy (or lose 
their interests) to such an extent that their morality is weakened significantly. As a result, we 
do not need a moral order in which morality and prudence perfectly coincide. A weak order 
involving rough compatibility, and substantial overlap, between morality and prudence 
suffices to avoid demoralization and an unresolvable dualism of practical reason.68 But we 
may need stronger arguments to support a weak type of moral order that is operative in human 
history, if this overlap and compatibility is to cover all cases (including exceptional cases), so 
that demoralization and paralysis are avoided completely.  
An additional way of supporting a closer connection between morality and prudence is 
to use a pragmatic argument. This type of argument typically starts from the assumption of 
certain objective moral facts, represented here by morality and prudence as necessary 
elements of practical reason.69 These moral facts are then thought to be best explained by 
assuming a type of moral order that involves (at least) significant overlap and rough 
compatibility between morality and prudence. Typically, one argues that we need to go 
beyond existing knowledge if we are to make sense of morality and prudence, and to avoid 
problems such as demoralization and an unresolvable dualism of practical reason. In order to 
make non-quietist morality possible, we then make constitutive assumptions about the moral 
structure of the world that transcend existing knowledge. We assume that practical reason is 
not doomed to failure due to demoralization or a stark dualism of practical reason, given a 
(weak) moral order that allows moral life by granting all the necessary conditions. More 
19 
 
specifically, we must rule out the assumption that the relation between morality and prudence 
is generally arbitrary or negative. Instead, we must assume that morality is roughly 
compatible with prudence, even if it does not always appear so. Conflicts between morality 
and prudence are taken to be less fundamental and less persistent than they may appear, and 
thereby we avoid believing that morality is overly demanding and unrealistic. 
Although this type of pragmatic argument is controversial, it can be rational, rather 
than irrational, if certain conditions are met. More specifically, the matter at hand must be 
urgent and of practical importance and the argument must not primarily serve wishes, 
inclinations or special interests. In addition, the argument must not conflict with existing 
knowledge.70 In this case, these conditions can probably be met if moral agents need some 
measure of happiness (or self-interest) in order to avoid demoralization and an unresolvable 
dualism of practical reason. Whether morality and prudence are realizable or not seems to 
represent a matter of utmost importance as far as practical rationality is concerned, since 
morality and prudence are not things we can dispense with altogether as humans. 
Furthermore, a moral order would, by its very nature, serve morality and general interests, 
instead of special interests, subjective wishes and inclinations. Finally, a weak form of moral 
order need not contradict existing knowledge. For we neither know the exact relation between 
morality and prudence in all cases, nor whether we ourselves are truly virtuous or whether all 
human lives are truly happy or prudentially rational.71 Exhaustive knowledge of how morality 
and prudence relate seems to require omniscience (knowing our hearts and minds and the 
whole of nature, both in the past and in the future). It is not sufficient to know about one’s 
own case, since we should also promote the happiness and interests of others.  
We should not assume that the virtuous are perfectly happy in this life. But neither 
should we assume that they become unhappy to such an extent that it inevitably results in 
demoralization or paralysis.72 We need therefore not accept strong forms of this argument, 
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such as Kant’s moral argument for the existence of God, which assumes that morality causes 
happiness. The pragmatic argument is only invoked to supplement the other arguments by 
assuming rough compatibility, not full overlap or identity, between morality and prudence in 
all cases. Even if it fails, we still have good, independent reasons for assuming considerable 
overlap and rough compatibility between morality and prudence in non-exceptional cases.73 
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